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Carey: Early Encounters between CPAs and the SEC

John L. Carey
TACONIC, CONNECTICUT

EARLY ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CPAs
AND THE SEC*
Abstract: The recollections of John L. Carey about the policies and politics in
professional circles during the very important period when the Securities Exchange
Commission first came into being. Mr. Carey served the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants in various capacities from 1925 to 1969, including
editor of The Journal of Accountancy and Administrative Vice-president, and received the Institute's gold medal for distinguished service to the profession.

The stock market crash of 1929 ruined many investors, large and
small. Thousands of people who had bought stocks on margin during the "New Era" boom of the late 1920's were completely wiped
out. Some men who had thought they were wealthy jumped out of
windows.
An angry public turned its wrath on the stock exchanges, the investment bankers, the corporations whose stocks had lost much of
their value, and to some extent the accountants who had audited the
financial statements of those corporations. However, the accounting profession had a lower profile then than now. Only the more
knowledgeable observers were aware of the auditors' role, so they
were not as visible a target as others. This dubious advantage was
not to last long.
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency launched an investigation of the securities markets, with Ferdinand Pecora, a tough
lawyer, as committee counsel. The findings were to result in the
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.
In 1932 two events fanned the flames. The international empire of
Kreuger and Toll collapsed when its head, Ivar Kreuger, known as
the "Swedish match king", committed suicide. It was found that he
had falsified accounts, forged documents, and concealed misappropriation of funds on a massive scale. American investors in his companies lost heavily, and questions were raised about audits of the
financial statements. American accountants who had any connec*Published first as Working Paper No. 33 by The Academy of Accounting Historians.
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tion with Kreuger and Toll subsidiaries were called upon to testify,
but since the frauds had occurred in Sweden, where no American
accountants had access to the records, they were not held responsible. However, doubts had been raised about the effectiveness of
financial reporting and independent audits in general.
Also in 1932, a book was published which had great impact in
sophisticated circles, and further encouraged demand for legislation
regulating the issuance of securities and financial reporting of the
issuers. This book was The Modern Corporation and Private Property, by Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, published under
the auspices of the Columbia University Council for Research in the
Social Sciences, acting on behalf of the Social Science Research
Council of America. So far as I know this was the first scholarly and
authoritative analysis of the modern corporation in America and its
relation to stockholders and investors. Its main thrust seems hardly
novel today, but it was news to many people then: that ownership
and management were almost completely separated; that management almost completely controlled the corporation's affairs; that
stockholders as a whole had little voice; and that the information
available to stockholders was often inadequate to permit sound
judgment of the risks they were assuming.
This naturally led the authors to discussion of corporate financial
reports and independent audits. In the preface credit was given to
Professor William Z. Ripley, "who must be recognized as having
pioneered this area". Professor Ripley's criticisms of the accounting profession in the mid-1920's had been responded to by George
O. May at the American Institute's 1926 annual meeting.
In 1932 George O. May had enjoyed some five years of freedom
from administrative responsibilities as senior partner of Price Waterhouse & Co. He was consultant to the Committee on Stock List of
the New York Stock Exchange, and chairman of the American Institute of Accountants' Committee on Cooperation With Stock Exchanges, which was working with the Exchange on the development
of new standards of financial reporting.
Among Mr. May's acquaintances was the brilliant young Columbia
University law professor, A. A. Berle, co-author of The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Somehow Mr. May must have learned
that the book was being written, and found opportunity to talk with
Berle before it was published. While Berle was highly critical of
current accounting practices, the criticism was somewhat tempered
by such interpolations as: "Accountants of the highest grade decline
to certify to such statements . . ." and "Capable accountants of a
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high degree of integrity will catch these situations as they arise . . ."
To me these modifications of an otherwise devastating indictment
were clear evidence of George O. May's diplomatic influence.
Although Professor Berle seemed to be a somewhat opinionated,
arrogant young man, his brilliance could not be questioned. A member of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "brains trust", Berle was the
principal author of The Modern Corporation, which later events suggested was almost a blueprint for the Securities Acts. So it was not
of trifling importance to have him say in the book, "the integrity of
the accountant and the soundness of his method are the greatest
single safeguard to the public investor", even though the compliment was diluted by the comment, ". . . The failure of the law to
recognize accounting standards is probably due to the lack of agreement among accountants... ."
My own acquaintance with Berle came about in this way. In the
spring of 1933 the "Truth in Securities Act" became law. Berle's
book, it could be assumed, had had some influence on the content
of that law. Berle himself was an advisor to the President. It seemed
to me that it would be a brilliant stroke of public relations to persuade him to speak at the annual meeting of the Institute to be held
at New Orleans in the fall. I cannot recall clearly whether the idea
originated with me or not, but I think it did. However, Mr. May could
have suggested it, and in any event he must have approved it, and
probably made the first approach to Mr. Berle.
As secretary of the Institute it fell to me to call on Professor Berle
and present the formal invitation. He was thin, sharp-featured, unsmiling and unbending. However, after I made my little speech, alluding to the interest in accounting manifested in his book, he
accepted the invitation to address the Institute's annual meeting.
I remember expressing the hope that he could take some time off,
away from all the pressures on him, and enjoy a few days' relaxation
in the attractive city of New Orleans after the meeting. He put me in
my place by saying rather frostily that if he had time for a vacation
he would take his family to some quiet spot without being involved
in a convention.
Anyway, I was jubilant at the prospect of having so influential a
personality address our meeting. His acceptance was highlighted in
the announcements, and doubtless influenced many members to attend. But I was to experience the first of many disappointments of
this kind — shortly before the meeting Professor Berle telephoned
to say that he could not attend in person but would send his paper.
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I pleaded with him not to disappoint the hundreds of accountants
who expected to hear him, but he was adamant, and that was that.
His paper, "Public Interest in Accounting," was read at the meeting by Walter A. Staub of New York. The paper did not evoke much
applause. It stated that accounting was ceasing to be in any sense
a private matter; it questioned a number of specific accounting practices; and it called for the consistent development of accounting
principles subject to the test of public interest. Then in the paper
Professor Berle questioned whether such principles could be developed by accountants alone — whether individual accountants
could maintain completely impartial minds when under the "instructions" of a client. He predicted that a government bureau would be
set up to standardize accounting practices in various industries.
At the meeting Walter Staub was asked to read Berle's paper.
Having dutifully done so, Mr. Staub opened the discussion by
strongly challenging the author's assumptions and conclusion.
Staub, a key partner of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery was
an extremely competent and influential man. He was an assiduous student of accounting and all that pertained to it. In his remarks, he pointed out the failure of government control of the accounting of railroads, utilities and banks. He cited the progress the
profession had already made, and was making, in cooperation with
the New York Stock Exchange and bankers, toward elimination of
accounting practices which Berle had criticized. Then Staub almost
angrily rejected Berle's patronizing doubts about the independence
and impartiality of public accountants.
Mr. Staub's remarks were warmly applauded, and were followed
by discussion from the floor. The audience sensed that control of
accounting by government was nearer than ever before. The Securities Act had become law only a few months earlier. It gave a government agency power to prescribe the form and content of financial
statements, and the methods to be followed in the preparation of
accounts. Among those at the New Orleans meeting anxiety was
mingled with resentment at Berle's too facile criticisms, and Staub's
strong defense of the profession was a welcome rallying cry.
Unfortunately, as I thought then and still do, this exchange of
views had little or no public exposure. So far as I remember, the
press was either unaware of the incident or paid it little attention.
Reporters were not in the habit of covering accountants' meetings,
and the general public showed no interest in accounting at all. It
was customary to publish in The Journal of Accountancy the papers
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presented at annual meetings, but in this case the powers that be
decided not to give Berle's views that much circulation. I ventured
to suggest that both his paper and Staub's rebuttal be published, but
to no avail. I was not the editor of The Journal, I had been secretary
of the Institute for only two or three years, and I had not reached
my thirtieth birthday, so my judgment on matters of high policy did
not weigh heavily! What I had dreamed of as a major public-relations coup turned out, to mix a metaphor, as a lead balloon.
In January, 1934, only a few months after the meeting at New
Orleans, the Institute published "Audits of Corporate Accounts," a
pamphlet containing the historic correspondence between the Institute committee headed by George O. May and the Committee on
Stock List of the New York Exchange, staffed by J. M. B. Hoxsey.
The negotiations leading to this publication had begun in 1930, as
recounted in the second paper of this series.
"Audits of Corporate Accounts" clarified the responsibilities of independent auditors: established the concepts of generally accepted
accounting principles and consistency in their application from year
to year; and proposed the first standard form of auditor's report,
which was immediately adopted and has survived with some
changes to the present day.
The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934
The events just described coincided roughly with the enactment
of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission to administer them both.
The 1933 Act was one of the first major reforms of the "New Deal"
launched by Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had been inaugurated as
President only a few months before this law took effect. The findings
of the so-called Pecora investigation provided background information for the legislative draftsmen.
While the bills were pending before Congressional committee the
Institute made some recommendations informally "through various
channels . . . to persons influential in the administration and in Congress." But the only certified public accountant to speak on the proposed legislation was Arthur H. Carter, then president of the New
York State Society of Certified Public Accountants. He appeared before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency to advocate
inclusion in the new law of a requirement that the accounts of registered corporations be audited by independent accountants.
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The fact that he took this step without consultation with the Institute pointed up some of the flaws in the profession's organizaional
structure, and in personal relations among some of its prominent
members. There were two national organizations — the Institute and
the American Society of Certified Public Accountants, of about equal
size. Almost as large as each of them was the oldest state society,
the New York State Society, most of whose members belonged to
neither national group. Partly because of this, and partly because
of its position astride the nation's financial center, this state society
considered itself independently competent to deal with national legislation affecting the profession, as well as local affairs.
Colonel Arthur H. Carter, then president of the New York State
Society, encouraged this attitude, partly, perhaps, because he had
not been made to feel an intimate member of the Institute's inner
circle. Colonel Carter was a relatively recent arrival among the
heads of the large accounting firms. He was a West Point graduate,
formerly a regular army officer, and author of a book on artillery
tactics which had attracted favorable attention in military circles.
He married the daughter of Elijah Watt Sells, one of the two founders
of Haskins & Sells. In 1919, after World War I, Colonel Carter joined
that firm and passed the CPA examination. In 1930 he became managing partner of Haskins & Sells.
He was a handsome man, of military bearing, with a flashing smile
and attractive personality. However, the habit of command apparently kept some colleagues at a distance. John Forbes, who had
been partner in charge of all Haskins & Sells west coast practice,
told me that Colonel Carter was a brilliant man, but just didn't understand the partnership relation. Mr. Forbes resigned from Haskins &
Sells, and then in 1932 became president of the Institute. This may
not have enhanced the Colonel's affection for the organization.
Then again, there was some feeling of rivalry between the large
firms of purely American origin — Haskins & Sells and Lybrand,
Ross Bros. & Montgomery — and those of British origin, many of
whose partners in America had come from England and Scotland —
Price Waterhouse & Co., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., and Barrow,
Wade, Guthrie & Co., for example. Since George May of Price
Waterhouse was highly influential in the Institute, Colonel Carter
may have been moved to demonstrate via his office in the New York
State Society that native American accountants were capable of
providing leadership.
In any case, he testified before the Senate Committee. It was not
a kindly audience. The questions and comments revealed an aston-
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ishing ignorance on the part of some senators regarding the nature
of independent audits. One senator seemed to suspect that the witness was seeking additional employment for certified accountants.
Questions ranged from how much audits would cost, to why corporation controllers needed to have their work reviewed, to why the
government should not perform the audits if they were necessary.
One senator asked bluntly, "Who audits you?" Colonel Carter's inspired reply, "Our conscience," has been quoted more than once.
In any event the Securities Act of 1933, as enacted, gave the administrative agency authority to require independent audits.
The first reaction was appointment of an Institute committee on
cooperation with the SEC. This committee, accompanied by the Institute's secretary (me), promptly waited upon Joseph P. Kennedy,
the Commission's first chairman. Mr. Kennedy was cordial enough.
He welcomed the offer of cooperation in developing regulations essential to administration of the accounting and auditing provisions
of the new securities laws. However, he didn't stay on the job very
long. He was appointed Ambassador to Great Britain, and was succeeded by James M. Landis, who, if memory serves me right, was a
former dean of Harvard Law School, briefly a member of the Federal
Trade Commission (which first administered the 1933 Act), and then
a member of the SEC.
Another member of the new SEC was George C. Matthews, who,
as I recall, had been a member of either the Wisconsin Public Utility
Commission or the Tax Commission. He knew more about accounting, albeit from a specialized, regulatory point of view, than most of
his colleagues. He was also a reasonable, moderate man, who was
willing to listen.
However, Mr. Landis was not so easy to deal with. Cordial and
conciliatory at first, he became increasingly critical of the accounting profession. He was a thin, tense, somewhat impatient man, almost humorless, and clearly feeling the pressure of his new responsibilities.
The Institute Committee on Cooperation With the SEC worked
very hard. There were many meetings in Washington with staff and
members of the Commission, most of which I attended. Much of the
discussion of technical matters was over my head, but it was clear
that the Institute representatives had a big job of education to do.
Most of the commissioners and top staff were lawyers or economists,
with less than a perfect understanding of accounting and auditing.
In developing policies and regulations covering these areas some
SEC officials were tempted to write a rule book establishing uniform
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accounting for corporations subject to their jurisdiction. The Institute committee kept pointing out the hazards of such an approach.
The publication in 1934 of "Audits of Corporate Accounts"
strengthened our committee's contention that the profession could
do the job of developing accepted accounting principles.
The commission had soon realized that it needed a full-time senior
staff assistant who was a qualified professional accountant. By a
stroke of good fortune Carman G. Blough was appointed to the
newly created post of Chief Accountant of the SEC. He had served
in the new Commission as security analyst and as assistant director
of the registration division. He was a CPA of two states, a former
member of the Wisconsin State Board of Accountancy, a former accounting professor and head of the accounting department at the
University of North Dakota, member of the Wisconsin Tax Commission, and secretary of the Wisconsin State Board of Public Affairs.
Blough was not only a competent accountant but was temperamentally ideally qualified for the new job. The ablest practitioners who
dealt with the Commission soon came to respect and like him. Perhaps more importantly, the commissioners themselves soon came to
rely on him heavily for decisions on accounting and auditing matters.
The critical importance of having such a man in the powerful
office of Chief Accountant of the SEC was soon to be demonstrated.
Chairman Landis, who always seemed to be harassed, his patience strained, could blow hot and cold. In January, 1935, speaking
before the New York State Society, he praised the CPA organizations for their help and cooperation and invited their criticism and
questions — "We need you as you need us." In October, 1935,
speaking before the American Management Association, he referred
to the accountants in a way that suggested they were helpful collaborators. But in December, 1936, in a speech to the Investment
Bankers Associations, he delivered this wintry blast:
The impact of almost daily tilts with accountants, some
of them called leaders in their professions, often leaves little
doubt that their loyalties to management are stronger than
their sense of responsibility to the investor... .The choice
here of more or less regulation is an open one for the profession. It is a 'Hobson's choice' for government.
This threat, without prior warning, was a shock. The chairman
of the Institute Committee on Cooperation With SEC telephoned
Mr. Landis to express concern. Mr. Landis, tired perhaps, was not
belligerent. He indicated a desire to be helpful, and suggested con-
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sultation with the Commission's chief accountants The result was an
arrangement whereby Carman Blough could consult the Institute
committee on questions involved in disagreements between the
commission's staff and accounting firms who had signed financial
statements filed with the SEC.
This blossomed into almost continuous consultation, including
frank informal discussions, between Carman and Institute representatives as well as individual partners of accounting firms. This give
and take focused on specific cases involving problems of corporate
financial reporting. Gradually a pragmatic, evolutionary approach to
development of accounting principles was developing.
As the Commission's confidence in Carman's competence and
judgment increased his recommendations became more and more
influential. The SEC dropped the idea of issuing a rule book, for the
time being at least, and offered the profession the opportunity to
take the lead in improving the situation, while reserving the SEC's
right to exercise its authority whenever it seemed desirable to do so.
Meanwhile, the profession had made some tentative steps toward
establishing formal, authoritative guidelines governing corporate
financial reporting, and the effort was soon to be beefed up substantially. But that is a subject for another paper.
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